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ABSTRACT 
Privacy is considered a fundamental inalienable right in most western 
democracies, and yet the understanding of privacy varies considerably among 
people. Research shows that people exhibit several paradoxical privacy behaviors. 
We contend that some of these paradoxical behaviors are related to privacy 
literacy. In this research we define privacy literacy and present scales to measure 
this literacy. We then associate the paradoxical behaviors with privacy literacy. 
We also contend that temporal discounting plays a significant role in some 
paradoxical behaviors because some individuals place a high value on short-term 
rewards which cause them to behave in ways that may be counter to their long-
term intentions. Our overarching research goal is to understand the motives (e.g. 
tangible rewards, curiosity, fame etc.) that lead users to voluntarily disclose their 
private information.  
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INDTRODUCTION 
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In the context of the internet, there has been strong advocacy for user privacy protection 
and rules for privacy protection (e.g., GDPR) keep getting stronger. GDPR and similar 
regulations in other countries assume that privacy is important. We also know that individuals 
routinely claim they value privacy but act in ways that suggest that they don’t. That is, espoused 
privacy (what we say) is very different from enacted privacy (what we do). While the notion of 
privacy seems important, is privacy that important to most people in everyday life? There may be 
long-term benefits of privacy, but there may by immediate gratification from disclosing 
information that outweighs the need for privacy. One explanation of the privacy paradox lies in 
the concept of temporal discounting (e.g., Green Fry and Myerson 1994; Rachlin and Raineri 
1992), wherein people prefer immediate gratification to long term benefits.  
There has been considerable research in understanding the privacy paradox, wherein 
people voice strong concerns for privacy while doing little to protect their personal data and 
voluntarily revealing their information in public forums such as social media. Needs for privacy 
vary in different situational contexts; a person may be very secure about their financial 
information but very careless about their health information. A person may be willing to have 
Alexa listen and record conversations in their home, but be opposed to video surveillance on 
public streets. The privacy calculus will vary among individuals from a situational context, based 
on individual propensities of risk in different domains.  
There are several unanswered questions related to privacy. How do people interpret and 
understand the concept of privacy, and is there a way to measure this understanding?  Also, do 
people have different desires for privacy across different contexts and/or with different types of 
information? Finally, how much privacy do users really want, and when do they want it?  
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There is extensive research on the issue of privacy paradoxes, the privacy calculus, and 
biases related to privacy decisions, however, the role of dispositional and situational factors in 
privacy decision analysis has not been comprehensively addressed. We plan to examine the role 
of personality in privacy calculus and how the privacy calculus morphs based on contextual 
changes. We plan to take a two-dimensional grid with one dimension being privacy attitudes, and 
the other being utility from disclosing private information, and map personality factors across the 
grid. As a precursor to this research, we will attempt to understand how people interpret and 
understand privacy in different contexts. We present results of this data collection and discuss 
our overall research design for our future research. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: 
Section 2 provides a review of the literature; Section 3 provides our data collection and results, 
and Section 4 provides the design for our overall research, followed by concluding remarks.  
LITERATURE 
The Privacy Paradox can be defined as a set contradictory attitudes towards privacy. One 
instance is the concurrent desires to be left alone and to be popular; people strongly feel the need 
for privacy, however they reveal their information freely on social media to improve their social 
standing. Another instance is having strong attitudes towards privacy and yet giving it up for 
minor gains, such as access to a website or a promotion (Acquisti 2004; Barnes 2006). Many 
users state a positive attitude towards privacy-protection behaviors, but are derelict in their own 
actual privacy behavior (Joinson et al. 2010; Pötzsch 2009; Tsai et al. 2006). Furthermore, while 
there may be an intention to limit the disclosure of sensitive data, users often disclose a lot more 
than they intend (Norberg et al. 2007). Users understand the privacy risks of revealing data 
online, yet they willingly disclose personal information for small gains like access to information 
or getting discounts (Acquisti and Grossklags 2005; Sundar et al. 2013). In the same vein, users 
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disclose personal information on social media for perceived gains, such as popularity or 
belongingness (Hughes-Roberts 2012; Manier and O’Brien Louch 2010; Nagy and Pecho 2009; 
Yoo et al. 2012). 
There has also been extensive research on privacy calculus, aka decision analysis, when 
making privacy choices. Decision models can vary from purely heuristic or impulsive to purely 
analytic. Privacy decisions explained by rational choice theory (Simon 1955) are based on purely 
rational decision making (Li et al. 2010; Keith et al. 2013; Li 2012; Culnan and Armstrong 1999) 
whereas heuristic models are based on preprogrammed responses based on past experience 
(Kahneman, 2011). Most of the models lie in the middle of the two extremes, where biases are 
incorporated into the user’s rational decision making. The variables for rational choice include 
financial gain, services, status and love, belongingness, convenience, and fame (Donnenwerth 
and Foa 1974; Foa 1971) whereas disclosure risks include embarrassment, security exposure, 
profiling, and lack of opportunity or victimization based on profiling. The biases in rational 
choices can include under/over estimation of risk, temporal discounting (immediate gratification) 
of gains/losses, optimism etc. 
Pentina et al. (2016) studied the role of personality and cross-cultural differences in the 
privacy calculation model, and found that extraversion and agreeableness decreased the risk 
perception of privacy decision making in all cross-cultural situations. They also note that 
satisfaction of informational and social needs led to privacy disclosure. The link between 
personality and privacy is under-developed; there are many more personality traits that may link 
personality to privacy behavior, for instance, people high in extraversion or sociability may 
disclose information more easily and people that rank high in neuroticism may tend to keep 
information private. Another trait that is likely to be related to divulging personal information is 
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the need for affiliation (the need to feel a sense of belonging within a social group), which is 
related to willingness to share. Also, personality traits may predict certain types of privacy 
behaviors but not others. For instance, Sociability or the need for affiliation might predict 
willingness to share socially-oriented information (e.g., activities on FB), but will be unrelated to 
sharing health information. An individual difference like risk perception or trust in might be 
predictive in both situations Consequently, we need to examine dispositional and situational 
factors in conjunction.  Another important question is the connection of personality to the 
privacy paradox i.e. to situations when a person’s privacy intentions and beliefs don’t correspond 
to their privacy actions. Perhaps people low on the conscientiousness scale or high on the 
opportunistic scale would show paradoxical behaviors in relation to information disclosure. 
DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
The concept of privacy is often vague for people, and they make their privacy decisions 
based on different understandings. The goal of this project is to understand how users interpret 
privacy in general, and across different domains. To understand the interpretation of privacy we 
designed a survey to ask people about their privacy interpretation and understanding. We 
surveyed participants with some open-ended questions. In total, we received answers from 34 
participants located in the U.S. (14 Males, 17 Females, 3 missing, mean age = 40.43, S.D. = 
11.11). We asked participants to define “privacy” in their own words. The definitions provided 
by the participants were very consistent, almost all of them distinguished between “self” and 
“others” and mentioned the ability to keep information to the “self” at will. One example of the 
definitions is “Privacy means that other people don't have information about me unless I 
specifically give it to them/allow them to have it.  It also means that I have a place that is a 
refuge that people can't see me or know what I am doing.”  
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We further asked participants to define privacy in specific domains, such as workplace, 
health-related information, financial information, personal relationships, online activities, 
location/schedule information, and conversation-related information. Regarding privacy in the 
workplace, there are several different aspects mentioned by participants: 1) non-work-related 
personal information not disclosed to the organization without permission; 2) the ability to keep 
personal space without being disrupted; 3) securing the organizational data; 4) personal work 
related information like habits and style. In domains other than work, people’s definitions on 
privacy are quite consistent. The table below provides some examples of definitions in areas 
other than workplace information. In addition to the dimensions listed, our participants added 
several more areas such as children’s information, political affiliation, religion, home address 
and other personal identifying information, personal environment privacy, and the contents of 
digital devices, the privacy of which they considered important.  
We further asked people to sort the privacy domains according to their importance. 
Participant answers were very different in this case. Some people viewed all domains as equally 
important (e.g., “I answered the same for most because privacy is very simple and 
straightforward for me, it is black and white, no grey areas. I have one basic perspective and it is 
above all else the most important aspect in anyone's life who wishes their life to be told only on 
their terms.”), while others regard some domains as particularly important and others as less so.  
Financial privacy and personal relationship privacy are the ones most often listed as most 
important.   
 
Table 1. Privacy domains and examples of participants’ definitions to these domains. 
Domains Examples of definition 
Health-related 
information 
Privacy of health-related information means that doctors, hospitals, and 
insurance companies must respect the sanctity of people's personal 
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medical situations, which may be embarrassing, sensitive, and or 
potentially harmful financially or socially if discovered. People have a 
right to visit a medical professional and know that, unless necessary for 
medical purposes, their details will not be shared with others. 
Financial 
information 
Being able to keep my financial information, transactions, dealings 
available for my eyes only or that of my financial institution. Credit 
cards, taxes, bank accounts, stocks, bonds, loans, etc. should be available 
for my eyes only or those that I specifically give permission to. 
Personal 
relationship 
1) This means any type of relationship I have with people, or even 
organizations should not be disseminated, as it [doing so] may 
bring harm to me or anyone associated with me. 
2) You can be in a relationship with someone and no one needs to 
know what you two are doing except you two.  Nobody needs to 
know if you are having sex, if you plan to have kids, hell, what 
you had for dinner…nobody needs to know NOTHING without 
your permission. 
Online activities It either means doing these activities anonymously, or it means 
understanding how information about my activities will be used, or it can 
mean limiting what entities can have access to in my history. 
Location/schedule 
information 
It means your location is not tracked, and details about your schedule are 




1) It means that whatever I share with someone by speaking with 
them must not be shared with anyone else unless I have given my 
permission to do so. 
2) It must be announced that my call to a business is being recorded, 
and those recordings will only be heard by people trying to 
improve customer service. Recordings in other contexts should 
similarly be announced. 
 
All participants considered privacy as either very important or extremely important (rated 
on a 1-5 scale with 1 as extremely important and 5 as not at all important, mean = 1.48, S.D. = 
0.51). However in contrast, when asked how well they think they protected their privacy, the 
participants’ response did not seem to be comparable to their ratings on the level of importance 
(rated on a 1-5 scale, with 1 as extremely well and 5 as not well at all, mean = 2.65, S.D. = 0.88). 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
Our future research is designed in two parts; in the first part we define the salient 
dimensions of privacy based on the literature and the data that we collected as a part of this 
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project.  To understand people’s privacy expectations, we ask users to rate the importance of 
privacy along each of the dimensions that we define i.e., workplace, health-related information, 
financial information, relationship with partners, children’s information, children’s performance 
in academics/sports personal information, political affiliation, religion, online activities, 
location/schedule information, conversation-related information, home address and other 
personal identifying information, personal environment, and the contents of digital devices. We 
also ask users to specify dimensions of privacy that we may not have gleaned from our data.  
In the second part of our study we test the relation between privacy and utility. Most of 
the past work has been done on the monetary value of privacy disclosures. Our goal is to 
understand the psychological drivers related to voluntary privacy disclosures. We design a series 
of scenarios around different dimensions of security and provide subjects with scenarios where 
privacy could be violated along with motives to disclose confidential information, i.e., curiosity, 
greed, fame, popularity, benevolence, etc. Please note that the focus of this work is not on 
malicious disclosure of information, which has already been examined extensively (Goel et al. 
2017; Zavoyskiy et al. 2018) but on disclosure of information without malicious intent.  
CONCLUSIONS 
Privacy paradox is a well-articulated phenomenon wherein users profess a need for 
privacy and yet disclose their private information readily. Our goal is to understand user 
interpretations of privacy, define contextual dimensions of privacy, evaluate the salience of these 
dimensions based on user preferences, and then understand the privacy/utility link across these 
dimensions. In this study, we found that although peoples’ definitions of privacy in most 
domains are quite consistent, their perceived importance of these domains vary. We also 
obtained a clearer picture about the domains in which people might be concerned about their 
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privacy. Therefore, we lay the groundwork for our research goals by attempting to delineate the 
important dimensions of privacy by collecting data from average users. We then present our 
research design based on the dimensions of privacy gleaned from the data.  
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